Infusing Reachability-Based Safety into Planning and Control for
  Multi-agent Interactions by Wang, Xinrui et al.
Infusing Reachability-Based Safety into
Planning and Control for Multi-agent Interactions
Xinrui Wang1?, Karen Leung2?, Marco Pavone2
Abstract— Within a robot autonomy stack, the planner and
controller are typically designed separately, and serve different
purposes. As such, there is often a diffusion of responsibilities
when it comes to ensuring safety for the robot. We propose
that a planner and controller should share the same interpre-
tation of safety but apply this knowledge in a different yet
complementary way. To achieve this, we use Hamilton-Jacobi
(HJ) reachability theory at the planning level to provide the
robot planner with the foresight to avoid entering regions with
possible inevitable collision. However, this alone does not guar-
antee safety. In conjunction with this HJ reachability-infused
planner, we propose a minimally-interventional multi-agent
safety-preserving controller also derived via HJ-reachability
theory. The safety controller maintains safety for the robot
without unduly impacting planner performance. We demon-
strate the benefits of our proposed approach in a multi-agent
highway scenario where a robot car is rewarded to navigate
through traffic as fast as possible, and we show that our
approach provides strong safety assurances yet achieves the
highest performance compared to other safety controllers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decision-making and control for robots is typically strat-
ified into levels, with each having different purposes. The
high-level planner, informed by representative yet simplified
dynamics of a robot and its environment, is designed to
be far-sighted and selects plans that optimize performance
metrics (e.g., minimize time to goal, control effort, and per-
ception uncertainty). While the low-level controller, running
at a much higher frequency than the planner, tends to be
more short-sighted and respects more accurate models of
the robot’s dynamics and control constraints in order to
implement the controls necessary to follow the desired plan.
However, when it comes to ensuring safety for the robot, the
divide between these components can lead to a diffusion of
responsibilities—the planner and controller may each devise
their own safety protocols, or even assume the other bears the
full responsibility, but when combined together, they may not
necessarily complement each other in achieving the shared
goal of ensuring safety for the system.
Safety considerations at the planning level can help dis-
courage a robot from entering potentially dangerous situ-
ations. However, ensuring safety typically competes with
other planning objectives (e.g., minimizing time and control
effort). Additionally, simplifying assumptions that underpin
a planner’s model of the environment may cause any strong
safety assurances claimed by the planner to no longer carry
much weight in practice due to model mismatch with the
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Fig. 1: Both the planner and controller use HJ reachability
theory to measure safety of the system, but apply this knowl-
edge in complementary ways. The high-level planner has the
foresight to avoid regions of possible inevitable collision.
When near safety violation, the safety controller evades
multiple agents with minimal intervention (green trajectory),
as opposed to a reactive controller (red trajectory).
real system. A low-level controller, whose primary purpose
is to track the desired plan, is typically too shortsighted
to include safety considerations especially with respect to
dynamic obstacles. Instead, the controller may switch to
a safety controller when near safety violation. The safety
controller may be an augmentation of the existing low-
level controller, or a different, possibly lower-level, reactive
control scheme. However, a switching safety controller that
completely overrides the system may severely compromise
planner performance and potentially create new unsafe situ-
ations (e.g., an autonomous vehicle stopping abruptly on the
highway can cause rear-end collisions).
In this work, we design a safe complementary planning
and control stack that provides safety assurance for a robot
without unduly impacting planner performance. We leverage
Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) reachability theory to provide the same
representation of safety for both the planner and safety
controller. In particular, the planner and safety controller
maintain their unique purposes, but share the same sentiment
when it comes to understanding safety. Further, in a multi-
agent setting, a robot may be in conflict as to which agent
to avoid if there is a danger of colliding with multiple
agents. We use HJ reachability theory to optimally select safe
controls that reason about collision avoidance with all agents
threatening the robot’s safety in a minimally interventional
way. We demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed framework
in a multi-agent highway setting where an autonomous car
must move quickly and safely through a densely populated
highway. The case study shows that by the planner and
controller sharing their interpretation of safety, the overall
interaction yields safe interactions that are more efficient and
higher performing compared to reactive safety controllers.
Related work: Safety at the planning level can be enforced
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
00
06
7v
1 
 [c
s.R
O]
  3
1 J
ul 
20
20
Fig. 2: A robot car (red) boxed-in by other externally
controlled (e.g., human-driven) cars (blue). If all cars behave
adversarially, collision is inevitable.
via hard constraints or incentivized through a planner’s
objective function. A common approach is to select plans that
avoid the inevitable collision set (ICS), though in practice
due to computational tractability, the forward reachable set
is used instead which is an over-approximation. For example,
[1], [2] prevent the robot’s planned trajectory from entering
the forward reachable set of the other agents in the environ-
ment and ensure the existence of a safe stopping maneuver
at all times. When no feasible trajectories can be found,
the robot switches to the emergency maneuver computed
from the last feasible plan. While these approaches guarantee
safety with respect to their modeling assumptions, they tend
to be overly-conservative for interactive scenarios, and rely
on strong modeling assumptions of other agents.
Alternatively, consideration of interaction dynamics be-
tween agents can reduce conservatism and enable proac-
tive behaviors. In the context of autonomous driving, a
probabilistic prediction model of the environment can be
learned from data and then used to inform a robot’s decision
making algorithm which strives to optimize a multi-objective
function with safety being one of the objectives [3], [4]. This
can lead to more efficient but potentially unsafe interactions
because safety competes with other objectives. [5] designs
artificial potential fields (APF) that reflect the reachable sets
of the other dynamic agents and use it for path planning.
They show that this improves the safety of a robot compared
to traditional gaussian APF methods. Regardless of how
safety is enforced at the planning level, model mismatch and
stochasticity in the environment make it very challenging to
provide strict safety assurance.
In turn, low-level controllers typically provide safety re-
actively; they switch to a safety controller when the system
is near safety violation. For instance, [6] selects a maneuver
from a library of pre-computed emergency maneuvers when
the system is in an unsafe state. A paradigm that can
account for general interactive scenarios is HJ reachability
analysis; by formulating the interactions between a robot and
its environment (e.g., other agents) as an optimal control
problem, a collision avoidance control can be computed and
applied when near safety violation [7], [8], [9]. However, a
switching-based safety controller that completely overrides
the system may not be ideal in some contexts, such as in
autonomous driving where sudden reactions could disrupt
traffic flow. Accordingly, [10] proposes a less invasive ap-
proach in passing a HJ reachability-based safety-preserving
control constraint into a robot’s low-level tracking controller.
This results in a minimally interventional safety controller
that enables a system to deviate from the desired trajectory
to the extent necessary to maintain safety. Through a traffic-
weaving case study with a single robot car interacting with
a single human-controlled car, they show that their approach
provides a good balance between safety and efficiency—
the robot stays safe without unduly impacting planner per-
formance. In the same vein, approaches that use control
velocity obstacles (CVO) (e.g., [11]) consider the set of
robot controls that prevent collisions with other agents in the
future. However, CVO requires an assumption on the other
agent’s policy which is difficult to obtain for interactive and
stochastic settings, and reasons about the future in an open-
loop fashion. This is in contrast to HJ reachability, which
reasons about collision-avoidance controls under closed-loop
dynamics.
Rather than treating the planning and control problem
separately, [12], [13] combine the two into a single joint
optimization problem. They show through an aggressive lane
change maneuver and an autonomous car racing example
that combining planning and control can be more desirable
because the resulting trajectory respects more accurate dy-
namic capabilities of the car while also cognizant of safety
constraints such as avoiding static obstacles and staying
within road boundaries.
The key research goal of this paper is to bring the planning
and control modules closer together in order to provide
stronger safety assurances in the context of multi-agent inter-
actions as illustrated in Figure 1. Solely relying on a safety
controller may be insufficient because an optimal collision
avoidance control may not always exist when near safety
violation, especially in the case of multi-agent scenarios. For
instance, consider an autonomous car that is boxed in, as
shown in Figure 2; in this situation, a collision is imminent if
any of the adjacent cars swerve towards it. This necessitates
the need to jointly design a planner and safety controller—
the planner should be cognizant of what type of situations
the safety controller is able to succeed in, while the safety
controller should be aware of the planner’s objectives such
that it does not unduly impact overall performance.
Statement of Contributions: The key contribution of this
paper is in using HJ reachability theory to provide a
shared notion of safety between the planner and controller
of an autonomy stack. Specifically, the contributions are
threefold. First, we provide high-level planners that op-
timize an objective function with the foresight to avoid
regions of possible inevitable collision by incorporating a
term into the objective function derived from reachability
theory. Second, when the system is near safety violation,
we propose a multi-agent safety-preserving controller that
is minimally interventional—the controller optimizes for
performance while treating safety as a constraint. This multi-
agent safety controller builds upon the work in [10] by
extending the controller to multi-agent settings. Third, we
demonstrate our approach in a highway scenario where an
autonomous car must safely traverse the highway as fast as
possible. We perform an ablation study and compare against
a reactive control strategy, and a baseline safety controller.
We show that our proposed approach offers a good balance
between safety and performance—we score relatively high
in both performance and safety metrics. The insights gained
from the experimental results are general since our approach
applies to any planner-control framework as long as HJ
reachability analysis is applicable to the system.
Organization: The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section II introduces the problem we are ap-
proaching and Section III provides a concise overview of
HJ reachability analysis. Section IV describes our proposed
methodology of aligning the planner and safety controller
by providing a shared notion of safety via HJ reachability
analysis. In Section V, we illustrate the benefits of our
approach with a case study in a multi-agent highway driving
scenario. We conclude in Section VI and suggest several
directions for future work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We follow a typical decision making and control paradigm
of utilizing a high level planner to compute a coarse trajec-
tory and a low-level controller to track it.
A. Robot Planner for Interactive Multi-agent Scenarios
We consider a multi-agent setting where a robot is op-
erating in an environment with multiple agents not con-
trolled by the robot (e.g., humans). Let x(t)r ∈X ⊂ Rnr and
u(t)r ∈ U ⊂ Rmr be the robot planner state and action at
time step t respectively. Let x(t)o ∈ Xo ⊂ RJno and u(t)o ∈
Uo ⊂ RJmo be the state and control of J other agents
in the environment at time step t. Further, let the time-
invariant and discrete-time state space dynamics for a robot
and other agents in the environment be given respectively
by, x(t+1)r = fr(x
(t)
r , u
(t)
r ), x
(t+1)
o = fo(x
(t)
o , u
(t)
o ). The goal of
a robot planner is to find a sequence of robot actions
u(t:t+N)r = pi(x
(t)
r , x
(t)
o ) that maximizes an expected reward
R(x(t)r , u
(t)
r , x
(t)
o ) over a fixed horizon of length N. That is,
we want to find a solution to the following maximization
problem
pi∗(x(t)r , x
(t)
o ) = argmax
u(t:t+N)r
E
[
N
∑
i=0
γ iR(x(t+i)r , u
(t+i)
r , x
(t+i)
o )
]
(1)
where γ ∈ [0,1] is a discount factor. Note that for interactive
scenarios, (1) is generally difficult to solve due to stochas-
ticity and coupling in the dynamics between the robot and
other agents, and that system may not be Markovian (i.e.,
depend on interaction history) [4], [10]. We assume that
such planners typically operate at around <10 Hz. As such,
they are not always able to account for split-second threats,
necessitating the need for a safety controller to intervene.
B. Low-level Safety Controller
A low-level controller, operating at a higher frequency
than the planner, takes the desired trajectory produced by the
planner (computed by simulating the system with the desired
action sequence) and computes relevant low-level control
commands for the system to execute. More concretely, let
z(t)r ∈Z ⊂ Rpr and w(t)r ∈ W ⊂ Rqr represent the low-level
state and control at time step t respectively. The low-level
controller may use a higher fidelity model than the planner,
z(t+1)r = fc(z
(t)
r , w
(t)
r ), in order to compute appropriate ac-
tuation commands for the system. Then µ :Z ×X →W :
µ(z(t)r ,xr) 7→w(t)r is a policy that maps current controller state
and desired planner state to actuation commands. When near
safety violation, the system may switch to a reactive policy
µsafe that selects control actions that keep the system safe
with respect to some metric Csafe(zr, wr, zo) where zo is the
low-level state of the other agents in the environment. That
is, in the most general sense, the optimal safe policy µ∗safe is
a solution to the following optimization problem,
argmin
wr∈W
Csafe(zr, wr, zo), s.t. System is safe.
which selects the safest action. Slack variables can be used
to ensure feasibility of the problem.
III. HAMILTON-JACOBI REACHABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we highlight key HJ backward reachability
concepts relevant to our proposed planning and control
strategy; see [8] for a more in-depth overview.
A. Overview
Given a dynamics model governing a robotic system
incorporating control and disturbance inputs, reachability
analysis is the study of the set of states that the system can
reach from its initial conditions, i.e., the reachable set. It is
often used for formal verification as it can give guarantees on
whether or not the evolution of the system will be unsafe, i.e.,
whether the reachable set includes undesirable outcomes. In
this work, we use backward reachability analysis because (i)
of its non-overly conservative nature stemming from closed-
loop computations, and (ii) the set is computed offline and
provide near-instant access online via table look-up. See [10]
for a more in-depth discussion on the suitability of backward
reachability for interactive scenarios.
There are many existing approaches to compute the reach-
able set of a system [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], but there
is a trade-off among modeling assumptions, scalability, and
representation fidelity. Compared to alternative approaches,
HJ reachability uses a brute force computation via dy-
namic programming and thus is the most computationally
expensive. However, HJ reachability is able to compute the
reachable set exactly1 for any general nonlinear dynamics
with control and disturbance inputs. Further, since the sets
are computed offline, we can access the set information
online via a near-instant look-up therefore enabling high
operating frequencies.
B. Backward Reachable Tube
In this section, we suppose that a system has dynamics
x˙ = f (x,u,d) where x ∈ Rn is the state, u ∈ U ⊂ Rm is
the control, and d ∈D ⊂ Rp is the disturbance. The system
dynamics f :Rn×U ×D→Rn are assumed to be uniformly
continuous, bounded, and Lipschitz continuous in x for a
fixed u and d. Let T ⊆ Rn be the target set that the
system wants to avoid. For collision avoidance, T typically
represents the set of states that are in collision with an
obstacle. The backward reachable tube (BRT) is the set of
states that could result in the system entering the target set
under worst-case disturbances within some time horizon |τ|
(τ is negative since we are propagating backwards in time).
The BRT is denoted by A (τ) and is defined as
A (τ) := {x¯ ∈ Rn : ∃d(·),∀u(·),∃s ∈ [τ,0],
(x(τ) = x¯) ∧ (x˙ = f (x,u,d)) ∧ (x(s) ∈T )}.
A (τ) represents the set of states from which there does
not exist a policy for the system that can prevent the
dynamics from being driven into the target set under worst-
case disturbances within a time horizon |τ|. As such, to rule
out such an eventuality, the BRT is treated as the “avoid set.”
1With precision dependent on parameters of the numerical solver, e.g.,
discretization choices in mesh size/time step.
C. HJI Value Function
Assuming optimal (i.e., adversarial) disturbances, A (τ)
can be computed by defining a value function V (τ,x) which
obeys the Hamilton-Jacobi-Issacs (HJI) partial differential
equation (PDE) [19]; the solution V (τ,x) gives the BRT as
its zero sublevel set,
A (τ) = {x : V (τ,x)≤ 0}.
The HJI PDE is solved starting from the boundary condition
V (0,x), the sign of which reflects set membership of x in T .
We cache the solution V (τ,x) to be used online as a look-up
table. For collision avoidance, V (0,x) typically represents
the signed distance between a robot and an obstacle (x ∈
T ⇐⇒ V (0,x)≤ 0). Then the solution V (τ,x) represents the
minimum signed distance between the robot and the obstacle
within a time horizon |τ| if the robot follows an optimal
policy under worst-case (i.e., adversarial) disturbances. As
such, the value function can be interpreted as a quantitative
measure of robot safety; the larger the value, the safer.
D. HJI Optimal Control
Given the HJI value function V (τ,x), the optimal robot
policy under worst-case disturbances is,
u∗ = argmax
u
min
d
∇V (τ,x)T f (x,u,d). (2)
Many robotic systems employing HJ reachability-based
safety switch to using (2) when near safety violation (i.e.,
when V (t,x)≤ ε, ε > 0) [7], [8], [9]. Recently, [10] considers
a less invasive control strategy and computes the set of
safety-preserving controls,
Usafe(x) = {u ∈U |min
d
∇V (τ,x)T f (x,u,d)≥ 0} (3)
which describes the set of controls that keep the value
function from decreasing under worst-case disturbances. By
passing Usafe as a control constraint over the next time step
when computing appropriate low-level controls, the system
is able to minimally deviate from the desired plan to the
extent necessary to maintain safety.
E. Collision Avoidance With Multiple Dynamic Agents
We can consider collision avoidance between two dynamic
agents by letting x represent the relative state of the system, u
correspond to the control inputs of the agent to be controlled
(i.e., the robot), and d correspond to the control inputs of
the other agent. The target set T is the set of relative
states corresponding to the system being in an undesirable
situation (e.g., in collision). In theory it is also possible
to formulate the relative state for more than two agents,
but is impractical because HJ reachability suffers from the
curse of dimensionality. We treat the pairwise interactions
independently (i.e., ignore interactions between other agents)
to circumvent the scalability issue. However, this treatment
can lead to issues regarding which pairwise interaction to
prioritize first. We address the prioritization issue in this
work by proposing an optimization problem that considers
all violating pairs equally.
IV. ALIGNING THE PLANNER AND CONTROLLER
A. Overview
Although the purpose of a safety controller is to keep the
robot safe when near safety violation, it is possible that the
robot may enter a state of possible inevitable collision, due to
shortcomings of the planner. Even when maintaining safety
is feasible, the resulting safety control may go against the
direction of the planner and lead to chattering. We propose
using HJ reachability theory to create alignment between a
planner and safety controller by ensuring that they both share
the same representation of safety. Further, in a multi-agent
scenario, a robot safety controller may be in conflict when
there are multiple agents to avoid. We use HJ reachability
theory to analyse pairwise safety (see Section III-E) and
propose a computationally efficient solution that prioritizes
collision avoidance with all pairs equally.
B. Assumptions
We assume control over one autonomous agent (i.e., a
robot) in an environment with multiple agents uncontrolled
by the robot (e.g., humans). In addition to the problem
formulation introduced in Section II, we make the follow-
ing assumptions. Suppose there are J other agents in the
environment. Let x( j)rel denote the relative state between the
robot and the jth agent. The relative state is derived from the
robot’s low-level state zr and the agent’s low-level state z
( j)
o .
The robot control is wr and the other agent’s control is w
( j)
o .
The HJI value function corresponding to the jth pairwise
system is denoted by V ( j)(τ,x( j)rel ).
C. HJI-aware Interaction Planner
A high-level planner selects actions that maximize a
reward shown in (1) which reflects desired goals, such as
reaching a goal state, maintaining speed, or reducing time.
We propose adding a term encompassing the HJI value
function between the robot and all other agents into a
planner’s reward function,
Rtotal(xr, ur, xo,xrel) = γRR(xr, ur, xo)+(1− γR)RHJI(xrel),
(4)
where xrel is the relative state between the robot and all other
agents. The designer can choose how to define RHJI(xrel) de-
pending on the application. For example, we use RHJI(xrel) =
min j V ( j)(τ,x
( j)
rel ) in the highway driving scenario studied in
this paper. The designer can adjust γR to tune the robot’s
preference for reward-seeking or safety-seeking behavior.
When the target set T is the set of collision states (or a proxy
for safety), the value function represents an upper bound on
how safe the future will be under worst-case disturbances.
With all else equal, a planner with an additional HJI term
in its reward function will select plans that are safer with
respect to backward reachability theory, i.e., the planner will
avoid states of possible inevitable collision, such as being
boxed-in by other agents (see Figure 2).
We make little assumptions on the structure of the
planner—the planner could reason about the interaction
dynamics jointly unlike our pairwise HJ reachability formu-
lation. The only assumption we make is that the planner
strives to maximize a reward function, and can accommodate
the addition of the proposed HJI term. For instance, this
could be applied to the planner used in [3].
D. Multi-agent Safety-Preserving Control
A system may fall back to a safety controller when near
safety violation. In HJ reachability applications, this occurs
when V (τ,x)≤ ε, ε > 0, i.e., when the system is close to the
boundary of the BRT. Since we consider pairwise interactions
Fig. 3: Snapshot from the highway simulation environment.
The robot car (red) is tasked to drive as fast as possible
through the traffic but avoid collision with other cars (blue).
between a robot and every other agent in the environment,
there is the problem of prioritizing which pairwise interaction
should be tackled first if safety is nearly violated for multiple
pairs. To address this issue, we propose selecting feasible
controls from the intersection of the safety-preserving control
sets (3) of all pairwise systems where safety is nearly
violated. Let
K = { j |V ( j)(τ,x( j)rel )≤ ε for j = 1, . . . , J}
be the set of indices k where safety is violated for that
robot-agent pair. Further, we strive to select controls that
are minimally interventional—controls that maintain safety
of the system without large deviations from the nominal
controls. As such, we propose the optimal safety controller
to be the solution of the optimization problem,
min
wr
g(wr), s.t. wr ∈
⋂
k∈K
U
(k)
safe(x
(k)
rel ) ∧ wr ∈W (5)
where g is a cost function on wr which may strive to achieve
high tracking performance or minimize control effort. In the
case where a feasible solution to (5) exists, HJ reachability
theory guarantees that the system will not enter a less safe
state with respect to the chosen dynamics, i.e., the value func-
tion will not decrease. For control affine systems, U (k)safe(x
(k)
rel )
is a hyperplane. In general, (5) could be nonlinear and
intractable to solve, especially at a high operating frequency.
Techniques to convexify the problem can be applied to make
(5) tractable (e.g., [10]). However, the problem will no longer
retain strict safety guarantees afforded by HJ reachability
theory. Slack variables can be used to ensure the problem
remains feasible and that the least-violating control is chosen.
V. CASE STUDY: AUTONOMOUS HIGHWAY DRIVING
A. Problem Set-up
Our experiments are conducted in a highway simulation
environment (see Figure 3) developed by [20]. The robot
car is tasked to drive through traffic as fast as possible
while avoiding collision. The other cars on the road interact
with each other using the Intelligent Driver Model (IDM)
[21], [22] and minimizing-overall-braking-induced-by-lane-
change (MOBIL) model [23] for longitudinal and lateral
control, respectively. These are common, and well-studied
traffic flow models. Our results, however, do not depend
critically on this modeling choice. The high level planner
runs at 1 Hz while the low level controller runs at 50 Hz.
1) High-level Planner: We formulate the highway envi-
ronment as a Markov decision process (MDP) and apply
the optimistic planning (OP) algorithm proposed in [24].
OP is a tree search algorithm where each branch represents
a possible future and the tree is explored optimistically.
We omit implementation details about the planner since
our proposed approach is agnostic to the type of planner
used. Instead we highlight some key features regarding our
planner that is representative of the class of planners that
our approach is applicable to. First, our planner relies on
a model of the environment, but in general, this model is
only an approximation of the true system. The existence of
model mismatch is prevalent in many model-based control
problems, including those for stochastic environments. In this
case study, the robot does not have access to the modeling
parameters of the other cars which are drawn from a normal
distribution, but instead assumes the mean of the distribution.
Second, our planner is reward-based and safety is promoted
via the objective function. As such, there will be times where
the robot will end up in an unsafe state, necessitating the use
of a safety controller.
2) Planner Dynamics and Reward Function: The robot
planner state is xr = (sp, `p,vp) where sp represents the
longitudinal distance along a lane, `p is the lane index,
and vp is the velocity of the robot. The state represent-
ing the J other cars xo is also of this structure, xo =
(s(1)p , `
(1)
p , v
(1)
p , . . . , s
(J)
p , `
(J)
p , v
(J)
p ). The action space of the
planner isU = {increase vp by 1ms−1, decrease vp by 1ms−1,
left lane change, right lane change, idle}. Given this state
and action representation, we design the following reward
function (without the HJI term),
R(xr,ur,uo) = rspeed(xr)+ rcrash(xr,xo)+ rlane(xr)
rspeed(xr) = γ1
vp− v
v− v , rlane(xr) = γ2
`p− `
`− ` ,
rcrash(xr,xo) =−γ31[xr in collision],
(6)
where v and v corresponds to the speed limits, ` and `
corresponds to the right-most and left-most lanes on the
highway. We select γ1 = 0.4, γ2 = 1.0, γ3 = 1.0, v= 15ms−1,
v = 30ms−1 for our experiment. This reward function is
designed to encourage the robot to stay in the left most lane,
maintain high speed, and avoid collision states. In order to
test the effectiveness of our proposed safety controller, we
encourage the robot to drive dangerously and weave through
dense traffic at a high speed.
3) Low-level Controller: We use the dynamically ex-
tended simple car model for the low-level dynamics of the
robot car and all other cars. Let the low-level controller state
be z= (px, py, θ , v) and control input be w= (δ , a) (for ease
of notation, we drop the subscript r and o denoting robot and
the other cars). The equations of motion for the dynamically
extended simple car model is,
p˙x = vcosθ , p˙y = vsinθ , θ˙ =
v tanδ
L
, v˙ = a, (7)
where L is the length of the car, px and py are the longitudinal
and lateral positions of the car in a fixed inertial reference
frame respectively, v is the signed speed of the car, and δ
and a are the steering and acceleration commands, respec-
tively. For the robot car, a closed-loop feedback controller is
deployed to track the desired planner trajectory. In the case
of tracking a sequence of waypoints, let xr = (sp, `p,vp) be
the desired planner state. Let zr = (px,r, py,r, θr, vr) be the
low-level controller state for the robot and ∆` be the signed
lateral distance between the robot and the center line of `p
(left of the centerline is positive). The closed-loop feedback
controller [20] that computes low-level controls to track the
desired planner state wr = (δ , ar) is,
δ = arctan
(−LKθ
vr
[
θr+ arcsin
K1∆`
vr
])
, ar = K2(vp− vr)
(8)
where Kθ , K1, and K2 are control gains to be chosen. In our
experiments, Kθ = 5.0 , K1 = 2.0, and K2 = 1.67.
Fig. 4: A slice of the HJI value function (see Section V-
A.5) with vo = 20ms−1, vr = 10ms−1, and the two cars are
parallel. px,rel > 0 corresponds to the robot car in front of
the other car. Since the other car has a higher velocity, it is
more unsafe (i.e., negative value) for the robot car to be in
front of the other car than behind it.
4) HJI Relative Dynamics: To compute the HJI value
function for a robot-agent system, we need relative dynamics
of the pairwise system. We use the dynamically extended
unicycle model for the robot, and a simplified unicycle
model for the other car. For ease of notation, we drop the
superscript denoting the jth pair, but the following equations
are referring to a particular robot-agent pair. The dynamics
for the robot and other car used for HJI value computations
are,
zr,HJI =
p˙x,rp˙y,rθ˙r
v˙r
=
vr cosθrvr sinθrωr
ar
 , zo,HJI = [p˙x,op˙y,o
v˙o
]
=
[vo cosθo
vo sinθo
ao
]
,
(9)
where wr,HJI = (ωr,ar) and wo,HJI = (θo,ao) are robot and
other car controls, respectively. We assume the control limits:
ω r ≤ ωr ≤ ω r, a ≤ ar, ao ≤ a, and θ o ≤ θo ≤ θ o. We select
dynamics slightly different to (7) to ensure tractability of
(5) (see Section V-B), and simpler dynamics when modeling
the other cars to (i) provide some conservatism to our model
by assuming the other cars are more agile than the robot
car, and (ii) prevent the relative state from becoming too
large since the value function computation suffers from the
curse of dimensionality. We define the relative coordinate
frame to be aligned with the inertial frame from (7) and take
the difference in position coordinates, (px,rel, py,rel) = (px,r−
px,o, py,r− py,o). Let the relative state between the robot and
the jth other agent be (still dropping the superscript j for
ease of notation) xrel = (px,rel, py,rel, θr, vr, vo). The relative
dynamics become,
p˙x,rel = vr cosθr−vo cosθo, p˙y,rel = vr sinθr− vo sinθo
θ˙r = ωr, v˙r = ar, v˙o = ao
(10)
5) HJI Value Function: To compute the value function
which represents the set of states the robot wants to avoid,
rather than using the signed distance function to define
V (0,xrel) which is typically used in HJ reachability literature,
we instead use the definition of Responsibility-Sensitive
Safety (RSS) introduced in [25]. We consider unsafe states
to be a function of both relative position, and velocity. For
brevity, we refer the reader to [25] for the mathematical
formulation, but provide a brief description here. Safety is
decoupled into longitudinal and lateral components. The lon-
gitudinal stopping, dlong, is defined as the distance between a
front and rear car if the front car applies maximum braking,
and the rear car accelerates maximally over a response time
before applying maximum braking. Analogously, dlat, is the
minimum lateral distance. A neighboring car is considered
unsafe if both the longitudinal and lateral distances between
the robot car and that car are less than dlong and dlat, respec-
tively. Given the velocities corresponding to a particular xrel,
we define V (0,xrel) as follows:
V (0,xrel) = max(|px,rel|−dlong, 4(|py,rel|−dlat)3). (11)
Figure 4 is a slice of the value function across the px,rel and
py,rel axes for a time horizon of |τ|= 3 seconds.
B. HJI Safety Controller
To compute the safety-preserving control set, let
∇V (τ,xrel) = (∂Vpx,rel , ∂Vpy,rel , ∂Vθr , ∂Vvr ,∂Vvo) (for ease of
notation, we temporarily drop the superscript j, but this is
in reference to a particular robot-agent pair). Then,
min
wo∈W
∇V (τ,xrel)T frel(xrel,wr,wo) = c1+ c2+∂Vθrωr+∂Vvr ar,
c1 = min
wo∈W
(
∂Vvoao−∂Vpx,relvo cosθo −∂Vpy,rel vo sinθo
)
,
c2 = ∂Vpx,relvr cosθr +∂Vpy,relvr sinθr,
where c0 = c1+c2 represents components not dependent on
the optimization variables wr and ar. From (5), the minimally
interventional multi-agent safety-preserving control is the
solution to the optimization problem (using the superscript
notation again for different robot-agent pairs),
min
ωr,ar
λ1(ωr−ωdes)2+λ2(ar−ades)2+λ3 max
k∈K
ηk
s.t. ∂V (k)θr ωr+∂V
(k)
vr ar ≥−c(k)0 −ηk for all k ∈K
ηk ≥ 0 for all k ∈K
ω r ≤ ωr ≤ ω r, ar ≤ ar ≤ ar.
(12)
where λi > 0 are weights (we use λ1 = ω−2r ,λ2 = a−2,λ3 =
1), ηk are slack variables, and ωdes and ades are the desired
controls from (8) (to map the HJI safety control ω to δ , we
use δ = tan−1 ωLv ). (12) is minimally interventional because
it minimizes tracking error subjected to safety constraints.
Alternatively, the robot can use a switching strategy by
letting λ2 = 0, ωdes = ωprev (to discourage discontinuous
steering inputs), and removing the ηk ≥ 0 constraint. The
safety controller will choose controls that satisfy, or violate,
each safety constraint equally (i.e., it prioritizes safety for
all cars equally). By our choice of HJI dynamics (9), the
optimization problem (12) is convex and we solve it using
CVXPY [26].
C. Experimental Results
To evaluate the benefits of our proposed planning and
control stack, we perform an ablation study and compare our
approach to the RSS policy proposed in [25]. For the high-
level planner, we investigate the following configurations,
• OP An OP planner only, i.e., γR = 1 in (4).
• HJOP An OP planner with a HJI reward term, i.e.,
γR = 0.9 in (4).
With a fixed planner (HJOP or OP), we investigate different
low-level safety control strategies used either in a switching
(SW), or minimally interventional (MI) scheme (see Sec-
tion V-B for the formulation):
• None No safety controller is used.
• RSS The RSS proper response policy proposed in [25]
provides the minimum longitudinal and lateral accel-
eration necessary to maintain safety. We use the RSS
Planner Controller Scheme TTC≥ 3
TTC 10th
percentile
BTN
≤ 1
BTN 90th
percentile
STN
≤ 1
STN 90th
percentile
Mean vr
(ms−1)
Mean |ar|
(ms−2)
Interven-
tions %
↑: higher is better, ↓: lower is better ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ -
HJOP SPC SW 1.000 9.927 1.000 0.079 1.000 0.016 21.878 1.273 9.5
HJOP RSS SW 0.996 17.125 0.998 0.030 0.994 0.006 20.343 4.066 55.0
HJOP SPC MI 0.999 9.607 0.995 0.109 0.994 0.017 22.000 1.154 18.1
HJOP RSS MI 0.996 13.914 0.998 0.028 0.995 0.008 20.301 2.788 57.5
HJOP None — 0.956 7.009 0.975 0.213 0.982 0.034 22.554 0.416 0.0
OP SPC SW 0.996 7.045 0.977 0.152 0.960 0.084 21.144 5.940 51.7
OP RSS SW 0.998 13.148 0.999 0.030 0.998 0.009 19.571 5.398 71.2
OP SPC MI 0.999 8.417 0.988 0.091 0.984 0.040 21.039 3.470 63.2
OP RSS MI 0.997 13.971 1.000 0.024 0.998 0.008 21.074 2.596 67.2
OP None — 0.502 0.785 0.714 5.616 0.782 3.189 28.141 0.386 0.0
TABLE I: Statistics for different planner and safety controller configurations. The values in the TTC ≥ 3, BTN ≤ 1, and
STN≤ 1 column represent the fraction of samples that satisfy the inequality. Our proposed method is in bold.
Fig. 5: The trade-off between safety (1st percentile TTC)
and performance (mean speed) computed from samples taken
over ten-second intervals across each episode. Three standard
deviation ellipses are shown.
proper response set instead of the HJI constraint in (12).
Under this RSS framework, there will be no accidents
where the autonomous vehicle is at fault from a planning
perspective.
• SPC Our proposed multi-agent HJI safety-preserving
controller (SPC) in (12).
To compare each approach, we use the following metrics,
• Time-to-Collision (TTC): The estimated time before col-
lision assuming both vehicles continue at constant speed
[27]. Lower values indicate a more dangerous situation,
while higher values are better with diminishing return.
• Brake Threat Number (BTN) and Steer Threat Number
(STN): The required longitudinal and lateral accelera-
tion for collision avoidance as defined in [28] divided
by maximum available longitudinal/lateral acceleration.
Lower values indicate safer situations.
• Mean velocity: The mean speed of the robot car over
all sample points. Higher values indicate better perfor-
mance (based on the planner’s reward function).
• Mean acceleration magnitude: The mean magnitude of
acceleration of the robot car over all sample points.
Lower values indicate more efficient driving.
• Intervention percentage: Percentage of samples where
the safety controller stepped in. Lower values implies a
safer planner.
We performed 20 episodes of 30-second highway simula-
tion with 50 Hz data collection for each planner-controller
configuration. Each episode consists of 100 other vehicles
that the robot needs to weave through as shown in Figure
3. This set up provides a sufficiently dense and challenging
environment to evaluate the effectiveness of each planner-
controller configuration. Statistics of the simulations are
listed in Table I, and the trade-off between safety, measured
by the 1st percentile TTC, and performance, measured by
mean speed, is shown in Figure 5. We select TTC = 3 as
the boundary between unsafe and safe to reflect the popular
“three-second rule” while driving, but note that this threshold
could be different.
We highlight three key takeaways from these results. First,
in the absence of a safety controller, adding an additional
HJI term to the planner’s reward function significantly im-
proves safety as measured by BTN, STN and TTC, but,
as expected, with a decrease in performance (i.e., mean
speed). We note that the efficiency (i.e., mean magnitude of
acceleration) of these two configurations are similar. Second,
SPC and RSS provide very similar levels of safety assurance
(considering the diminishing returns of larger TTC), yet
SPC provides better performance and higher efficiency than
RSS. RSS experiences more interventions, and therefore is
likely to execute more braking and swerving maneuvers. We
hypothesize that when using the RSS safety controller, the
misalignment of the notion of safety between the planner
and RSS controller results in chattering. Third, the MI
scheme is more efficient (i.e., lower acceleration) than SW,
yet performs similarly well in terms of safety metrics. In
practice, using MI may be more desirable because the SPC
and RSS controller assumes worst-case outcomes by the
other agents, but this may not necessarily be what happens
over the entire interaction. In other words, MI prevents the
robot from overreacting every time safety is nearly violated.
Instead of prioritizing all agents equally, future work can be
directed at assigning priority to which agent to avoid. For
example, weighing each safety constraint based each agent’s
likelihood of following an adversarial policy.
Further, we can visualize the safety-performance trade-off
in Figure 5. The OP+None configuration is clearly the fastest
but the most unsafe. The top right corner corresponds to the
region with highest safety and performance. Although the
RSS controllers with HJOP provides higher safety metrics,
the diminishing return nature of TTC indicates that our
proposed method HJOP+SPC (green) is in the ideal region—
it is above the TTC = 3 line, and furthest to the right.
D. The Mechanism Behind HJOP+SPC
We take a closer look at how the HJOP and OP planners
behave in a potentially dangerous situation. Consider the
situation shown in Figure 6 (left); the desired plan computed
by each planner which, for this example only, assumes the
other cars move at constant speed. The next two plots show
the robot’s roll-out over the next two time steps. The OP
planner (in green) chooses to squeeze in between the two cars
Fig. 6: Snapshots of the robot’s desired plan using different
planning strategies.
Fig. 7: Optimal controls using the SPC and RSS safety
controller. In this example, ωprev = 0. Left: Front red car is
traveling 20ms−1, and other two cars are traveling at 25ms−1.
on its left, while the HJOP planner (in red) changes to the
right lane to avoid being trapped by the other cars. Figure 7
visualizes the set of safety preserving controls considered by
the SPC and RSS controllers for a situation where the robot
(in green) desires to move to the left lane (see left figure)
but safety is near violation by two agents. We see the safety-
preserving control constraints imposed by HJ reachability
and RSS (orange region indicates the intersection of all
safety-preserving control sets), and the solution to (12) for
the MI and SW cases. The box-constraint nature of RSS
makes it more restrictive than SPC. Due to linear constraints,
MI chooses controls on the boundary and as close to the
desired control as possible. While SW selects controls close
to the ωprev while satisfying the control constraints as much
as possible.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
By sharing the same interpretation of what it means to be
safe, the planning and control modules which are typically
designed separately are now complementary and can pro-
vide safe yet performant behaviors. Our proposed approach
leverages HJ reachability theory and, as demonstrated with a
multi-agent highway driving scenario, equips a robot with the
foresight to avoid regions of possible inevitable collision, and
the ability to minimally deviate from the desired trajectory
to the extent necessary to avoid collision with multiple
agents. We propose three future research directions; the
first would be to extend the idea of using a HJI value
function as part of the objective function beyond planning
algorithms, such as for trajectory optimization, or as a feature
in inverse reinforcement learning. The second would entail
exploring different ways to define the target set (i.e., V (0,x))
when computing the value function, and understanding how
it affects the safety-performance trade-off. The third is to
design smarter priority assignment, such as through chance
constraints, when safety is nearly violated by multiple agents.
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